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RECENT DECISIONS

NEGLIGENCE - INJURY FROM BooILY MovEMENT OF SLEEPING DEFENDANT - Defendant, while asleep on the rear seat of the automobile driven
by plaintiff, kicked the back of the front seat, thereby throwing plaintiff
forward and causing plaintiff to lose momentary control. Plaintiff brought this
action for injuries sustained when the car crashed into a culvert. Held, the trial
court properly instructed the jury that defendant was entitled to a verdict if he
was asleep at the time he kicked the front seat. The supreme court stated,
"fundamentally to create liability for an act alleged to be negligent, it must
be shown to have been the conscious-act of a person's volition." 1 Lobert v.
Pack, 337 Pa. ro3, 9 A. (2d) 365 (1939).
The early common-law concept of compensation for every injury regardless
of defendant's culpability has been generally abandoned, 2 although a few remnants still remain. 8 Fault is the true basis of tort liability. But it seems that even
at early common law defendant1s action had to be at least conscious and voluntary in order for liability to be imposed.4 In fact, bodily movement by one in

Principal case, 9 A. (2d) at 367.
CooLEY, ToRTs, Throckmorton ed., §§ 12, 308 (1930); I STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 3 ( 1906) ; Wigmore, "Responsibility for Tortious Acts:
Its History-Ill," 7 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1894).
3 Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N. Y. 290, 55 N. E. 923 (1900) (blasting); Bohlen,
"The Rule of Rylands v. Fletcher," 59 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 298 (1911); HARPER,
ToRTS, § 166 (1933) (trespassing cattle), ibid., § 172 (ferae naturae).
4 "But there is a good deal of appearance of authority in the older books for the
1

2
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a~ unconscious state, or any other involuntary movement, is legally not an act
at all. 5 A distinction must be drawn in the law between volition and intention.
Volition refers to some manifestation of the will; intent refers to a state of mind.
Intent to injure is not necessary _in the field of negligence, but the act complained of must have been voluntary.6 The principal case points out that there
is little judicial authority on the relation of sleep to tort liability. Several decisions, summarized in the principal case, are to be found involving automobile
drivers fainting, falling asleep, or in some way becoming suddenly unconscious.
If the driver was not negligent in falling asleep, but sleep came upon him suddenly ,and without reasonable expectation, injuries from a consequential collision are not redressable. 7 While sleeping, he is unconscious, and one is liable
only for conscious acts. Such being the rule as to drivers, then a fortiori it should
apply where a guest or occupant rather than the driver is sought to be held.
Furthermore, it would seem that, quite apart from the driver cases, a passenger's
mere act of falling asleep could seldom if ever be considered negligent.8 The
case of sleep is not analogous to insanity or to intoxication, where on grounds of
public policy such individuals are held liable for their torts, at least where intent
is no ingredient of the tort committed. Courts will not permit a person to become
voluntarily intoxicated and thereby escape liability where a sober man would be
held.9 The law generally looks askance on voluntary drunkenness. Again, on
contrary proposition that a man must answer for all direct consequences of his ooluntary
acts at any rate.'' PoLLocK, ToRTS, 14th ed., 108 (1939) (italics added). Wigmore,
"Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History-III," 7 HARV. L. REv. 441 (1894);
HoLMEs, THE CoMMON LAW 82 (1881). See also, Smith v. Stone, Style 65, 82 Eng.
Rep. 533 (1647).
5 "An act is always a voluntary muscular contraction, and nothing else.'' HOLMES,
THE CoMMON LAw 91 (1881). "There cannot be an act without volition •••. move-ments of the body during sleep when the will is in abeyance are not acts.'' I TORTII
RESTATEMENT, § 2 (1934).
6 45 C. J. 637 (1928).
7 4 BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAw 158 (1935); Bushnell v.
Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 A. 432 (1925); Cohen v. Petty, (App. D. C. 1933)
65 F. (2d) 820; Slattery v. Haley, 52 Ont. L. R. 95 (1922); Cooper v. Kellogg, 2
Cal. (2d) 504, 42 P. (2d) 59 (1935); Dishman v. Whitney, 121 Wash. 157, 209
P. 12 (1922). In the last named case the driver while cranking the automobile received a head blow, unconsciously got into the automobile and backed up, causing
injury. But see, Leary v. Oats, (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) 84 S. W. (2d) 486 at 490,
where the court said: "even if the jury found that Leary was suddenly attacked by some
ailment which rendered him unconscious and therefore unable to control his machine,
and that such condition of mind was the sole cause of the accident, that would have
been no defense under the authorities cited and followed by us in this case.'' It is of
interest to note that some of the authorities cited were cases of insane or intoxicated
persons.
8 However, the Massachusetts court did hold in Oppenheim v. Barkin, 262 Mass.
281, 159 N. E. 628 (1928), that a guest voluntarily going to sleep is contributorily
negligent as a matter of law. Whether the Massachusetts court would apply the same
rule if actionable negligence rather than contributory negligence were involved is a
matter of speculation. At any rate, the Oppenheim case has been widely criticized by
other courts as clearly unsound. Nelson v. Nygren, 259 N. Y. 71, 181 N. E. 52 (1932).
9 Powell v. Berry, 145 Ga. 696, 89 S. E. 753 (1916); Bageard v. Consolidated
Traction Co., 64 N. J. L. 316, 45 A. 620 (1900).
·
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grounds of public policy, insane people are held liable for their torts, the chief
reason being to encourage those particularly interested in their estates to care
properly for them.10 But even in cases of insanity, some writers argue convincingly that if insanity is so extreme as to negative intent to do the very act,
the act is not voluntary and no liability should attach.11 Therefore, even if an
analogy were to be attempted, according to these writers the result in the
principal case would be the same. But whatever the law on intoxication and
insanity, the same policy is not applicable to sleep. With one possible exception,12
no court can be found attempting such an analogy, and the court in the instant
case expressly and correctly rejects this analogy suggested by plaintiff's counsel.

1 °CooLEY, ToRTS, Throckmorton ed.,§ 45 (1930); and see notes 51 A. L. R.
833 (1927) and 89 A. L. R. 476 (1934).
11 SALMOND, ToRTS, 9th ed., 70 (1936); Cook, "Mental Deficiency in Relation
to Tort," 21 CoL. L. REV. 333 (1921). But see CooLEY, ToRTS, Throckmorton ed.,
§ 45 (1930). It is admitted by the writers that there is a dearth of case law on the
precise point. In Donaghyv. Brennan, 19 N. Z. L. R. 289 (1900), the New Zealand
court held defendant liable for assault though his insanity was of such degree as to
render him incapable of voluntary action.
12 Leary v. Oats, (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) 84 S. W. (2d) 486. See, supra, note 7.

